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THE NOTIONAL LEGISLATOR: 
THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS 
COMMISSION'S ROLE AS A LAW-MAKER 
Stephen Bottomley* 
I INTRODUCTION 
Socio-legal scholars have long recognised the importance of understanding the 
difference and the interaction between the 'law in the books' — the formal legal rules 
and doctrines made by parliaments and the courts, and the 'law in action' — the 
processes and practices by which those rules and doctrines are put into effect.1 
Similarly, public lawyers and regulatory theorists have highlighted the importance of 
understanding the role of regulatory discretion in the enforcement of rules.2 The 
commonly understood message in these overlapping areas of research is that we 
cannot properly understand the law if we limit our attention to formal rules. A related 
point is that there is nothing necessarily improper about the exercise of regulatory 
discretion. Nor is there anything necessarily improper about the fact that the processes 
of rule enforcement can produce different outcomes than might be suggested by a 
simple reading of the rule itself.3 
Corporate lawyers are familiar with all this. The financial and commercial context 
in which corporations operate is complex and fast-changing, and it is simply not 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
* Professor of Commercial Law, ANU College of Law, The Australian National University. 
My thanks to the anonymous referees, and to Emma Armson, Peter Bailey, Peter Cane, 
Michael Coper, Kath Hall, Peta Spender, Leslie Zines and other participants at a work-in-
progress seminar held at the ANU College of Law for helpful comments. Thanks also to 
Nick Swan for his diligent research assistance. The arguments developed in this article 
were assisted greatly by interviews with representatives from the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, the Department of Treasury and the Financial Services Council. 
Needless to say, the responsibility for any errors is mine. 
1 The terminology is credited to Roscoe Pound, 'Law in Books and Law in Action' (1910) 44 
American Law Review 12. The distinction was revisited in the 1970s; see, eg, David Nelken, 
'The "Gap Problem" in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review' (1981) 1 The Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice 35. 
2 See, eg, Robert Baldwin and Keith Hawkins, 'Discretionary Justice: Davis Reconsidered' 
(1984) Public Law 570; Robert Baldwin, Rules and Government (1995) ch 3; Robert Baldwin 
and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation — Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) ch 8. 
3 See John Griffiths 'Is Law Important?' (1979) 53 New York University Law Review 339 on the 
direct, indirect, intended and unintended effects of legal rules. 
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possible for laws promulgated at one point in time by Parliament (or the courts) to 
capture all the subtleties of current practice or the changes that inevitably occur later 
on. Consequently, corporate regulators are given discretionary power to decide how 
and when they will enforce the rules, along with the capacity to grant exemptions from 
the operation of the law. For example, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (′Corporations 
Act′) gives the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) the power to 
exempt persons or companies from a number of requirements in the Act.4 All this is 
necessary so that the law can be applied appropriately in particular cases.  
This article is concerned with the exercise of regulatory discretion, but the focus has 
more to do with the 'law in the books' than the 'law in action'. Specifically, the article 
examines ASIC's discretionary power to write the 'corporate law in the books'. 
Alongside its power to grant exemptions from the application of specific provisions in 
the Corporations Act, ASIC also has the power, in certain instances, to change the 
operation of the Act itself (and the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth)) by omitting, 
modifying or inserting provisions. 
It is important to be clear about the import of the preceding paragraph: along with 
its power to exercise 'on the ground' discretion to alter the way in which legislative 
rules are applied (for example, by granting exemptions in particular cases), the 
executive agency5 that is charged with administering the corporations legislation6 has 
the power to re-write aspects of that legislation. It can, in effect, do the work of 
Parliament.  
This power is unique amongst Australian Federal regulatory agencies. It is also, as 
far as I can determine, unique amongst corporate regulatory agencies elsewhere. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the Financial Services Authority has power to make and 
then modify or waive its own rules 'as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for the 
purpose of protecting the interests of consumers.'7 In the United States, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has similarly broad authority to make, amend and 
rescind 'such rules and regulations as may be necessary'.8 These two examples are akin 
to a power to make delegated legislation whereas, by contrast, ASIC has the power to 
modify the primary legislation.9 The closest that the SEC comes to ASIC's power of 
statutory modification is found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which gives the 
SEC power in an emergency to 'alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or 
restrictions with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the 
Commission'.10 'Emergency' is defined as 'a major market disturbance' characterised, 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
4 See, eg, the list of sections in Table 1 of this article. 
5 ASIC is a statutory corporation established by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
6 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 5B states that 'ASIC has the general administration of this Act'. 
See also Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 11. 
7 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 138(1). 
8 Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC § 19. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 23(a)(1), 
giving the Commission power to make rules and regulations. 
9 ASIC also has power to make rules that regulate market integrity in domestic licensed 
financial markets, see Corporations Amendment (Financial Market Supervision) Act 2010 (Cth). 
10 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 12(k)(2). 
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for example, by 'sudden and excessive fluctuations of securities prices generally'.11 
ASIC's power of modification is not limited in this way. 
The existence and operation of ASIC's power has attracted little critical attention in 
the legal literature, be it academic, judicial, or professional. It did, however, come to 
momentary public prominence towards the end of 2008, in the depths of the global 
financial crisis, when ASIC modified sections in the Corporations Act that regulate 
short-selling. 
II  THE SHORT SELLING MODIFICATIONS 
By September 2008, the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression was 
wreaking havoc in financial markets. One of the signal events in this crisis occurred on 
Monday 15 September, when the giant investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy protection in the United States, prompting a massive fall in financial 
markets around the world. It was in this climate that, late on Friday 19 September, 
ASIC issued a Class Order12 under which Part 7.9 of the Corporations Act, which 
regulates the issue, sale and purchase of financial products, was to apply as if a new 
section was inserted. The new section (s 1020BC) imposed disclosure requirements on 
persons involved in covered short sales.13 The Class Order was to commence operation 
on the following Monday, 22 September 2008.14 The Explanatory Statement which 
accompanied the Class Order noted that it was being issued in response to 'abnormal 
levels of volatility' in global securities markets, adding that similar action was being 
taken by regulatory agencies overseas, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Major brokers were contacted by ASIC over the weekend of 20–21 
September to inform them of the new requirements. 
Before the end of that weekend, ASIC issued another Class Order15 on Sunday 21 
September which amended the Class Order that had been issued two days earlier. The 
new Class Order added another new section (s 1020BD) which prohibited covered 
short selling of securities traded on licensed financial markets in all but a limited 
number of situations. The Explanatory Statement noted that the amendment was a 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
11 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 12(k)(7). 
12 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order — Covered Short Sales, 
CO 08/751, 19 September 2008. ASIC Class Orders usually are identified by the label 'CO', 
the year of issue (in this case, 2008) and an identifying number, in square brackets. In the 
text of this article Class Orders will be identified in this way. 
13 Short selling is the sale of securities which, at the time of the sale agreement, the seller does 
not own. The seller may at the time have an enforceable right to obtain the shares through 
an agreement with another party; this is known as a 'covered' short sale. Alternatively, in a 
'naked' short sale there is no other agreement in place at the time of the sale agreement. The 
seller must then purchase or borrow the required shares before settlement of the sale 
agreement. 
14 Simultaneously on 19 September the Australian Securities Exchange, with ASIC's 
agreement, announced that it would abolish naked short selling from the opening of 
trading on 22 September: ASX Media Release, 19 September 2008. 
15 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order — Variation of Class 
Order CO 08/751, CO 08/752, 21 September 2008. 
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response to restrictions on short selling in various overseas markets. This Order was 
also to commence operation on Monday 22 September. 
On Monday 22 September, a further Class Order16 was issued which amended the 
new s 1020BD by adding managed investment products and stapled securities to the 
prohibition. The following day, Tuesday 23 September, ASIC issued further extensive 
amendments to the new s 1020BD, in yet another Class Order.17 The purpose of these 
amendments was to permit certain forms of covered short selling. 
So, in a period of just over four days, two new sections of the Corporations Act had 
come into operation, regulating a major form of market activity, and those sections had 
then been subject to several amendments,18 all without any parliamentary 
involvement.19 These were, of course, unusual times. Markets were experiencing some 
of the worst aspects of the global financial crisis, and governments and regulators 
around the globe were scrambling to respond. Acknowledging the uniqueness of the 
context, it is nevertheless important to note that there was nothing new about the 
powers being exercised by ASIC to modify the Corporations Act. The legislative 
provisions under which these Class Orders were issued predated the financial crisis. 
They had been, and have since been, used frequently in much more ordinary market 
situations. 
The purpose of describing the short selling modifications is to illustrate the extent 
and operation of ASIC's legislation making power. This article is not concerned with 
the substance of these particular changes — I leave aside debates about whether short 
selling, covered or naked, should be regulated and, if so, how that should be done.20 
My interest lies with the modification power itself, and with its implications for ideas 
of parliamentary democracy, for the legislative process, and for certainty and clarity in 
the administration of corporate law in this country. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
16 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order − Variation of Class 
Order CO 08/751, CO 08/753, 22 September 2008. 
17 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order — Variation of Class 
Order CO 08/751, CO 08/763, 23 September 2008. 
18 This was not the end of the story. Before the end of 2008 there were subsequent Class 
Orders. On 23 October ASIC Class Order [CO 08/801] added a further exemption to the 
prohibition in s 1020BD (see Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class 
Order — Variation of Class Order CO 08/751, CO 08/801, 23 October 2008); with effect on 19 
November, ASIC Class Order [CO 08/824] amended s 1020BD to permit covered short 
selling of non-financial securities, and amended the reporting regime in s 1020BC (see 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order — Variation of Class 
Order CO 08/751 and CO 08/764, CO 08/824, 13 November 2008). In January 2009 ASIC 
Class Order [CO 09/1052] amended both s 1020BC and 1020BD, in anticipation of 
parliamentary amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 (see Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order — Variation of Class Order CO 08/751, CO 
09/1052, 5 January 2009). On 25 May 2009, s 1020BD was omitted entirely by ASIC Class 
Order [CO 09/39] (see Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class 
Order — Variation of Class Order CO 08/751, CO 09/39, 25 May 2009).   
19 The Federal Parliament did not sit until three weeks after these events. The process of 
parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation is described in Part VI of this article. 
20 For a comparative analysis, see Kym Sheehan, 'Principled Regulatory Action? The Case of 
Short Selling' (Paper presented at the Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference, 
Sydney, 3 February 2009). 
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Some particular aspects of the short selling story are worth emphasis, however. 
First, the modifications were initiated by ASIC in response to its concerns about the 
state of financial markets.21 Secondly, the modifications received considerable 
publicity in the financial press, as well as being publicised via the Australian Securities 
Exchange.22 As a consequence, it is likely that these modifications to the Act were 
widely noticed in the financial sector and business community. Thirdly, the provisions 
in the Corporations Act that deal with short selling were subsequently amended by the 
Corporations Amendment (Short Selling) Act 2008 (Cth), which commenced in stages 
between December 2008 and December 2009. One aspect of the Amendment Act was 
the introduction of a section which declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that the 
Class Orders made by ASIC regarding short selling were validly made.23 On these 
points, the short selling Class Orders were something of an exception to the usual 
course of events. As the next part of this article notes, ASIC's usual practice is to decide 
modifications in response to applications made to it by market actors. Further, most of 
the legislative changes made by ASIC in the ordinary course of its work go unnoticed 
except by those in the corporate and finance sector who are specifically affected, and 
few of these changes subsequently result in parliamentary amendment of the 
Corporations Act. Finally, it should also be noted that the short selling modifications 
were unusual insofar as they created a prohibition on certain conduct and, thus, 
imposed potential liability on persons affected by those Class Orders.24 In the more 
typical case, modifications made by Class Order are beneficial, providing relief from 
requirements in the Act for a class of persons.25 
III ASIC'S POWER TO MODIFY THE CORPORATIONS ACT 
Currently there are fifteen sections in the Corporations Act which grant ASIC the power 
to modify specified provisions in the Act, as listed in Table 1.26 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
21 Evidence to Senate Standing Committee on Economics (Supplementary Budget Estimates), 
Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 22 October 2008, 160–4 (Tony D'Aloisio, ASIC 
Chairman). 
22 In addition, as required by the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 24, each Class Order 
was registered and published on the Federal Register of Legislative Instruments. ASIC also 
publishes all of its Class Orders on its website Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Instruments and Class Orders (18 February 2011) <http://www.asic.gov.au/ 
asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Instruments>. 
23 See Corporations Act s 1484 (commencing 11 December 2008), declaring ASIC Class Orders 
[CO 08/751], [CO 08/752], [CO 08/753], [CO 08/763] and [CO 08/801] to be ′validly made′. 
Sheehan suggests that the passage of this Act demonstrates that the process leading to 
making the Class Orders was known to have been deficient: above n 20, 28. 
24 A point noted by Sheehan, above n 20, 28. 
25 The Corporations Amendment (Short Selling) Act 2008 (Cth) inserted s 1020F(8) which, 
amongst other things, states that a modification under s 1020F(1)(c) may prohibit any form 
of short selling of financial products.  
26 This Table omits Corporations Act ss 342A and 1073E(2), which authorise ASIC to make 
limited modifications in specified circumstances. 
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These sections are, for the most part, drafted in similar terms. They permit ASIC to 
declare that all or specified provisions27 in a particular Chapter or Part of the Act will 
apply to 'all persons, specified persons, or specified class of persons', or to 'a person or 
class of persons', as if those provisions were 'omitted, modified or varied' as specified 
in the declaration. While ASIC can issue a declaration in relation to a single person,28 
the focus here is on declarations that omit, modify or vary provisions in the Act (for 
brevity's sake, I describe these changes simply as modifications) in relation to all 
persons, or to a large or open ended class of persons. The short-selling modifications 
were an example of this. When the discretionary power is exercised in relation to a 
large or open-ended class of persons (for example, takeover bidders, buyers and sellers 
of securities, or responsible entities of registered schemes), ASIC issues a Class Order 
which sets out the details of the changes to be made. 
 
Table 1 
Section Grants power to modify 
s 283GA(1)(b) Ch 2L Debentures 
s 601QA(1)(b) Ch 5C Managed Investment Schemes 
s 601YAA(1)(b) Ch 5D Licensed Trustee Companies 
s 655A(1)(b) Ch 6 Takeovers 
s 669(1)(b) Ch 6A Compulsory Acquisitions and Buyouts 
s 673(1)(b) Ch 6C Substantial Shareholder Information 
s 741(1)(b) Ch 6D Fundraising 
s 798D(1)(b) s 205G and Chs 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, 6CA, and 7 
s 926A(2)(c) Pt 7.6 Licensing of Financial Services Providers 
s 951B(1)(c) Pt 7.7 Financial Services Disclosure 
s 992B(1)(c) Pt 7.8 Other Provisions re Financial Products & 
Financial Services 
s 1020F(1)(c) Pt 7.9 Financial Product Disclosure 
s 1075A(1)(b) Pt 7.11 Title and Transfer of Securities 
s 1437(2)(b) Aspects of Ch 10 Transitional 
s 1442(2)(b) Aspects of Ch 10 Transitional 
  
 
ASIC's process for issuing Class Orders is described in its Regulatory Guide 51, 
Applications for Relief.29 This document makes it clear that issuing Class Orders is only 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
27 The term 'provisions' is defined to include a reference to regulations made for the purposes 
of that Chapter or Part (see, eg, s 601QA(5)). 
28 ASIC will sometimes make identical modifications for a number of successive individual 
applicants. 
29 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 'Applications for Relief' (Regulatory 
Guide No 51, December 2009) <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/ 
LookupByFileName/rg51.pdf/$file/rg51.pdf>.The Commission has also issued regulatory 
guidance for specific exemption and modification powers, for example 'Fundraising: 
Discretionary Powers' (Regulatory Guide No 151, February 2000); 'Licensing: Discretionary 
Powers '(Regulatory Guide No 167, January 2007); and 'Foreign Collective Investment 
Schemes' (Regulatory Guide No 178, May 2004). 
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one aspect of the Commission's wider discretion to grant relief from the Corporations 
Act.30 According to the Regulatory Guide, the exercise of this discretion is made in 
response to applications submitted to ASIC. This comprises a significant part of the 
Commission's work; for example, in the 12 months from December 2007 to November 
2008, ASIC considered 3 385 applications for relief, and granted individual or class 
relief (whether by exemption, variation or modification) for 2 614 (77 per cent) of those 
applications.31However, as the short selling story indicates, ASIC may also act of its 
own accord, and the wording of the sections which grant the modification power 
permits this.32 
ASIC classifies applications for relief as either 'standard' (where relief is sought in 
accordance with published ASIC policy), 'minor and technical' (seeking the application 
of existing policy to a new situation that is not contemplated by the Act), or 'new 
policy' (asking ASIC to formulate substantive new policy). According to the 
Regulatory Guide, in responding to applications ASIC seeks to exercise its discretion 
consistently with existing policy, and 'on the basis of principles which are definite and 
whose limits are clearly defined.'33 A key principle is that the Commission will grant 
the relief being sought where it is demonstrated that there is a net regulatory benefit or 
that any regulatory detriment is minimal and is outweighed by commercial benefit.34 
Relief will take the form of a Class Order where 'it is not necessary to consider any 
relevant factual matters on a case-by-case basis.'35 Further, the Regulatory Guide 
emphasises that: 
In general, we will not use our discretionary powers to effect law reform. That is, relief 
will not be given to reverse the usual and intended effect of the Corporations Act …36 
On a broad view, of course, any modification or change to the way in which the 
Corporations Act applies to a class of persons constitutes a reform of the law, at least as 
far as it affects that class of persons, but presumably ASIC intends that it will not use 
its powers to make rules which implement entirely new policies which have not 
already been dealt with in the Act or Regulations.37 The problem, nevertheless, is that 
no clear line can be drawn here. As will be seen in Part IV of this article, Class Order 
modifications are used to achieve a range of goals, from the relatively mundane (eg 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
30 The Guide also deals with relief from the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth), the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), and the National Consumer 
Credit Protection (Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Act 2009 (Cth). 
31 Data taken from ASIC quarterly reports on decisions on relief applications, available at 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Reports (30 March 2011) 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Reports>. 
32 This is reinforced in Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Reform Amendment 
Bill 2003 (Cth) [3.65] which notes that 'in most situations' exemption and modification 
powers are exercised in response to requests. 
33 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ′Applications for Relief′ above n 29, 
[51.51]–[51.53]. 
34 Ibid [51.57]. 
35 Ibid [51.63]. 
36 Ibid [51.62]. 
37 Confirmed in an interview with ASIC officers (Sydney, 15 July 2010). 
8 Federal Law Review Volume 39 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
fixing errors in the Act) to anticipating upcoming legislative reforms. Certainly, the 
short selling Class Orders qualified as an example of law reform.38 
The Corporations Act adds little to this picture. Only three of the sections listed in 
Table 1 specify any considerations to be taken into account by the Commission before 
it exercises its powers of modification or other relief. Sections 655A(2) (concerning 
takeovers) and 673(2) (substantial shareholdings) each require ASIC to consider the 
matters set out in s 602 of the Act when deciding whether to make an exemption or 
declaration. Section 602 contains a modified version of what are known as the 
Eggleston principles,39 according to which the regulation of takeovers has four aims: 
the shareholders and directors of a company that is the subject of a takeover bid should 
know the identity of the bidder, have enough information to assess the merits of the 
offer, have a reasonable time to consider the offer, and have a reasonable and equal 
opportunity to participate in the offer. Additionally, the section states that the 
acquisition of control of a company should take place in an 'efficient, competitive and 
informed market'.40 The third section — s 1075A(2) (dealing with title to and transfer 
of securities) — specifies a different set of preconditions and is expressed in stronger 
terms. ASIC may only exercise its power of exemption or modifications regarding pt 
7.11 of the Act if it is satisfied that the interests of the holders of the financial products 
will have adequate protection, and that the exemption or modification will make the 
transfer of those financial products more efficient. It should also be noted that the 
exercise of any of the modification powers found in ch 7 of the Act must take account 
of s 760A which sets out the main objects of the Chapter, which include the facilitation 
of 'efficiency, flexibility and innovation in the provision of [financial] products and 
services', and the promotion of 'fair, orderly and transparent markets for financial 
products'.41 
The absence of more specific legislative guidance on the boundaries of ASIC's 
discretionary power of modification has led the Federal Court to confirm that 'there is 
no statutory foundation for stating that the power [of modification] … should be used 
"sparingly".'42 This has two potential consequences. First, to the extent that ASIC 
chooses to be cautious in the use of its power, this may lead to confusion or 
dissatisfaction amongst applicants for Class Order relief.43 Alternatively, to the extent 
that ASIC does occasionally exercise the modification power more broadly it reinforces 
the appearance of a system in which the regulator can make rules of wide application 
that bypass the processes of substantive public scrutiny and accountability that can be 
applied to statutory rules. These issues are addressed later in this article. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
38 Noted also by Sheehan, above n 20. 
39 Named after Sir Richard Eggleston, chair of the Committee whose 1969 report on takeover 
law first recommended these principles: Company Law Advisory Committee, Parliament 
of Victoria, Second Interim Report to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General on Disclosure 
of Substantial Shareholdings and Takeovers (1969). 
40 This last point is a more recent addition to the original Eggleston principles. 
41 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 760A(a) and (c). Similarly, the modification powers in Chapter 
10 would take into account the objects for that Chapter set out in s 1370. 
42 Otter Gold Mines Ltd v Australian Securities Commission & Ors (1997) 15 ACLC 1 732, 1 738. 
43 A point suggested during an interview with Financial Services Council representatives 
(Sydney, 31 August 2010). 
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ASIC describes the new or amended sections which it creates via these Class Orders 
as 'notional sections' (thus, the Class Orders that dealt with short selling referred to 
'notional s 1020BC'). Presumably this is intended to indicate that these provisions do 
not have formal status of sections in the legislation. The notional sections do, 
nevertheless, have force of law. Their effect is the same as that of formal legislative 
provisions. The High Court has noted that a modification operates 'to bind a court … 
by requiring that court to apply the [Act], as varied, to a particular person or case. It 
create[s] a new set of rights and obligations'.44 The result is that a given section or Part of 
the Act may be comprised of the formal legislative text plus a 'notional' or 'shadow' set 
of modifications that can only be determined by consulting the relevant Class Orders.  
IV  THE WORLD OF CLASS ORDERS 
As an indication of the extent of activity in this area Table 2 lists the number of Class 
Orders made by ASIC per year since the commencement of the Corporations Act in 
2001:45 
 
Table 2 
Year No of Class Orders 
made 
2001 35 
2002 148 
2003 65 
2004 90 
2005 53 
2006 24 
2007 37 
2008 22 
2009 25 
2010 3046 
 
The Table shows that the production of Class Orders is clearly a regular part of 
ASIC's business.47 In reading the Table it is important to bear in mind that not all Class 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
44 ASIC v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321, 333 (emphasis added). The Court was 
referring to the modification power found in a forerunner to the current s 655A(1), found in 
s 58 of the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Code of 1980. 
45 These figures are drawn from ASIC's website, see above n 22. As will be seen, the 
modification powers pre-date the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and there are a number of 
pre-2001 Class Orders still in operation. 
46 2010 figures as at 3 December 2010. Six of the 2010 Class Orders were made under the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) or the National Consumer Credit Protection 
(Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Act 2009 (Cth). 
47 It is likely that the comparatively large number of Class Orders in 2002 resulted from the 
implementation of the new Corporations Act 2001, and similarly, the increase in 2004 may 
have resulted from the commencement of the Financial Services Reform Amendment Act 2003 
(Cth) between December 2003 and July 2004. 
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Orders modify the Corporations Act. Many, for example, specify exemptions from the 
Act. Indeed, according to officers from ASIC, exemptions are the preferable response 
where relief is to be granted because, compared to modifications, they can be drafted 
with greater certainty.48 It is interesting to note, though, that modifications still account 
for a significant proportion of these Class Orders. For example, of the 77 Class Orders 
issued in 2008–10, approximately 40 per cent dealt with exemptions while another 40 
per cent dealt with modifications to the statute or regulations.  
Nor does Table 2 indicate how many Class Orders are currently in force because 
some of the Class Orders included in this count have either expired or have been 
withdrawn or revoked by subsequent Class Orders. Nevertheless, as the Commission 
has noted, 'a substantial number of ASIC class orders remain in effect for some time 
(many of these will be amended at various times).'49 Of the 529 Class Orders listed in 
Table 2, 406 remained in force at the beginning of December 2010. 
The reference to revocation and amendment of Class Orders points to a significant 
feature of this mode of law-making: the world of Class Orders is every bit as variable 
and complex as that of the primary and secondary corporations legislation. Class 
Orders can cross-refer to other Class Orders; they can amend or repeal other Class 
Orders. They can apply to a wide and open-ended class of persons or to a more closely 
defined group of corporate actors. They can be made in response to 'problems of the 
moment' (as with the short selling Class Orders), to perceived gaps in the legislation 
(for example, to accommodate new financial products that were not contemplated 
when the legislation was written),50 to unintended or unanticipated consequences of 
the operation of the legislation in particular cases,51 or in anticipation of foreshadowed 
amendments to the Act or Regulations.52 They can give rise to legislative reform or, as 
is more commonly the case, simply co-exist with the Act. The subject matter of Class 
Orders is usually technical, detailed, and concerned with matters of procedure, as is 
typical of much delegated law-making. The following four examples, chosen 
somewhat randomly, provide a non-exhaustive illustration of this variety and of the 
uses to which the modification powers can be put. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
48 Interview with ASIC officers (Sydney, 15 July 2010). 
49 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission to LIA Review Committee: 
Review of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003, May 2008,) 11. 
50 Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Reform Amendment Bill 2003 (Cth) [3.66]. 
51 Ibid [3.65]. 
52 For example, ASIC Class Order [CO 10/333], (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, ASIC Class Order − Corporations Act 2001 — Paragraphs 601QA(1)(b), 
926A(2)(a), 992B(1)(a) and 1020F(1)(a) — Declaration and Exemptions, CO 10/333, 5 May 
2010), exempting funded representative proceedings from provisions in the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) that regulate managed investment schemes, was made in response to the 
Government's announcement that it intended to make Regulations to the same effect 
(Explanatory Statement in Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class 
Order − Corporations Act 2001 — Paragraphs 601QA(1)(b), 926A(2)(a), 992B(1)(a) and 
1020F(1)(a) — Declaration and Exemptions, CO 10/333, 5 May 2010). This, in turn, was a 
response to the decision in Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners 
Pte Ltd [2009] FCAFC 147, holding that a funded representative action was a managed 
investment scheme as defined in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9. 
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Example 1 — fixing errors in the Act: ASIC Class Order [CO 05/21] was issued in 
January 2005 and made a minor modification to s 990A of the Corporations Act. The 
amendment was necessary because at that time s 990A contained a cross-reference to 
another section in the Act, concerning the appointment of auditors. In July 2004 that 
other section had been repealed and replaced with a new set of sections, but s 990A 
had not been amended to reflect this. The Class Order was issued to 'remove 
undesirable uncertainty for many financial service licensees'.53 It updated the cross-
reference in s 990A so that it referred to the new section. The Class Order was revoked 
in October 2007 (by ASIC Class Order [CO 07/569]) after subsequent parliamentary 
amendments to s 990A removed the incorrect cross-reference. 
Example 2 — creating exemptions from the Act: ASIC Class Order [CO 05/26] was 
issued in May 2005 and as of December 2010 was still in force. It deals with the 
requirement in Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act that the price at which interests in a 
registered managed investment scheme are issued must be governed by the terms of 
the scheme's constitution.54 The purpose of the Class Order is to specify exemptions 
from this requirement. It does this by modifying the application of Chapter 5C; that 
Chapter now applies to a responsible entity as if the provisions of the Chapter were 
modified by the addition of three new sections (ss 601GAA–GAC). This Class Order 
revises and updates similar exemptions which had previously been specified in Class 
Order [CO 98/52], which is revoked by the new Class Order. 
ASIC Class Order [CO 05/26] has been amended by a number of subsequent Class 
Orders with the consequence that, by December 2010, the new sections created by [CO 
05/26] had been amended in various ways on seven occasions since they were made. 
As an indication of the self-referential nature of the world of class orders, one of those 
amendments — made by ASIC Class Order [CO 09/465] — changed the notional 
subsection 601GAA(4) to permit a responsible entity to set the issue price of interests 
'in accordance with ASIC Class Order [CO 09/425]'.55 So, in summary, since 2005 the 
Corporations Act has applied to responsible entities56 of managed investment schemes 
with the operation of three added sections. Those notional sections have been amended 
frequently since then, including one amendment which incorporates requirements 
specified in another Class Order. 
Example 3 — expanding the operation of the Act: ASIC Class Order [CO 07/429] was 
issued in June 2007 and as of December 2010 was still in force. It modifies the operation 
of ss 636 and 638 of the Corporations Act to permit certain takeover documents (a 
bidder's statement or a target's statement) to include a credit rating reference, a 
statement in a historical geographical report, or a trading data reference, without the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
53 Explanatory Statement in Australian Securities and Investment Commission, ASIC Class 
Order Corporations Act 2001 — Paragraph 992B(1)(c) — Declaration, CO 05/21, 14 January 
2005. 
54 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601GA. 
55 ASIC Class Order [CO 09/425] specifies certain exemptions from provisions in the Act 
governing share and interest purchase plans; see Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, ASIC Class Order Corporations Act 2001 — Share and Interest Purchase Plans, CO 
09/425, 15 June 2009. 
56 Except for responsible entities of time-sharing schemes, see Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order — Constitutional Provisions about the 
Consideration to Acquire Interests, CO 05/26, 4 May 2005 [4], [5] and [5A]. 
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consent of the maker of that statement.57 The Class Order applies to any bidder or 
takeover target. Originally this modification was made by inserting four new 
subsections into each of ss 636 and 638. In each of those sections, one of the new 
subsections (sub-s 636(4A) and sub-s 638(6A)) was subsequently deleted, as of January 
2010, by ASIC Class Order [CO 09/1084], with the effect that credit ratings can no 
longer be cited without the consent of the credit rating agency. ASIC Class Order [CO 
07/429] was also amended by [CO 09/422] to correct a typographical error. 
Example 4 — streamlining the operation of the Act: ASIC Class Order [CO 09/38] was 
made in May 2009. It revokes a Class Order that was made in 2004 — [CO 04/1556]. 
The revoked Class Order had modified the operation of Part 7.7 of the Corporations Act, 
which regulates financial services disclosure. The modification had permitted financial 
advisers who provided additional advice to a retail client to issue a Statement of 
Additional Advice, rather than having to prepare a fresh Statement of Advice that 
repeated information previously given to that client. A Statement of Additional Advice 
could simply incorporate the previously provided information by reference. This 
earlier Class Order was revoked because in August 2007 the Corporations Regulations 
2001 (Cth) were amended to provide for incorporation by reference in Statements of 
Advice, thus making the earlier Class Order redundant. The amendments to the 
Regulations were preceded by an extensive consultation process conducted by the 
Treasury, between 2006 and 2007. Interestingly, none of the consultation papers 
released by Treasury, nor the Explanatory Statement to the amending regulations, 
made reference to the existence or operation of the pre-existing ASIC Class Order.  
To repeat, in the context of ASIC's powers of statutory modification there is nothing 
unusual about these examples; indeed, they indicate the 'usual business' of Class Order 
modifications. Nor do they describe the entire range of purposes for which 
modification Class Orders might be issued. They are highlighted here to provide a 
picture of the likely circumstances in which ASIC uses its powers, of the different ways 
in which these Class Orders can operate, and of the variety of ways in which Class 
Orders can affect the Act and the Regulations. 
V  THE HISTORY OF ASIC'S POWER OF MODIFICATION 
The history of the sections which give the corporate regulator the power to modify the 
corporations legislation goes back to the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Code of 1980 
and the Companies Code of 1981. There was little comment at the time in any of the 
parliamentary debates, Explanatory Memoranda, or other associated documents about 
the inclusion of these powers. What comment there was seems to have regarded the 
need for such powers as self-evident. When introducing the Companies (Acquisition of 
Shares) Code to Parliament in 1980, the Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs 
simply noted in passing that 'the [Commission] also has power to declare that the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
57 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 636(3) and 638(5) provide, respectively, that bidder's 
statements and target's statements must not include a statement made by a person unless 
the person has consented to the inclusion of that statement. 
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[Code] applies to a person in a particular case as if the [C]ode were modified in a 
particular manner.'58 
There had been some prior consideration of the need for the new corporate 
regulator to have some form of rule-making power. In 1968 the Eggleston Committee 
had recommended the establishment of a Companies Commission with power to grant 
relief from statutory requirements relating to accounts 'and with power to add or vary 
those requirements' either in relation to individual companies or more generally to 
companies of a defined class.59 Six years later, in its influential 1974 Senate Report on 
the regulation of Australian securities markets, the Rae Committee argued the need for 
creation of a national corporate and securities commission, established as a statutory 
corporation. In the course of putting its case, the Report noted simply that 'the 
regulatory body will need to exercise rule-making powers, [and] to exercise 
discretionary powers'.60 
It appears that the idea of granting rule-making powers to the corporate regulator 
may also have been influenced by a report written by Professor Louis Loss from 
Harvard University.61 Professor Loss was the author of a leading multi-volume treatise 
on securities regulation in the United States.62 He was invited by the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department to write a report on his views about 
the regulation of Australian company and securities markets. In his 1973 report, Loss 
urged that 'it would be well to give the [Australian] Commission a maximum of 
flexibility so far as rules (many of them inevitably experimental) are concerned.'63 His 
view was based on his experience of the Securities Exchange Commission in the 
United States. As he explained: 
a broad [rule-making] power is universally considered in the United States to be essential 
to complex legislation of the kind under discussion. For (1) legislative draftsmen cannot 
possibly anticipate all the problems and avoidance techniques that will be developed; (2) 
speed is apt to be required if the barn door is to be locked in time; and (3) the 
Government cannot be running back to Parliament every few months.64 
Professor Loss was writing from a particular economic and regulatory background, 
and his recommendation must be understood in that light. Indeed, he acknowledged 
this in his report, pointing to the different size of the Australian economy and to 
differences between Australian parliamentary procedures and those in the US 
Congress. Professor Loss might also have based his recommendation on certain 
assumptions about the proper role or place of the regulatory authority in relation to the 
legislature. Certainly it seems (and the quote above bears this out) that Professor Loss 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
58 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 April 1980, Vol H of 
117, 1635 (Victor Garland). 
59 Company Law Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General [the 
Eggleston Committee], Parliament of Victoria, First Interim Report on Accounts and Audit 
(1968) [41]. 
60 Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange [the Rae Committee], Parliament of 
Australia, Australian Securities Markets and their Regulation (1974) 16.18. 
61 I am grateful to Tony Hartnell for alerting me to this. 
62 Louis Loss, Securities Regulation (Little, Brown and Company, 2nd ed, 1961). 
63 Louis Loss, Proposals for Australian Companies and Securities Legislation: Comments from the 
American Experience (Cth Attorney-General's Dept, 1973) 22. 
64 Ibid 23. 
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had in mind a command and control approach to corporate regulation in which the 
regulator's task is to catch attempts to avoid the rules and to 'lock the barn door' on 
non-compliant behaviour. As we have seen, however, this is not the sole or even 
primary use to which the modification powers have been put. The use of the 
modification powers frequently has a facilitative purpose; I return to this later in the 
article.65 
The subsequent history of the modification provisions in the legislation shows a 
gradual broadening of the scope of these powers. The Companies Code of 1981 originally 
contained one such section, s 109(4), which gave the Commission the power to declare 
that the Division in the legislation relating to prospectuses would apply to 'a particular 
person' or 'persons in a particular case' as if a provision or provisions was or were 
omitted, modified or varied. A similarly worded provision was included in the 
Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Code of 1981 (which regulated takeovers), but in this 
case the exercise of the power was expressly subject to the Eggleston principles.66 In 
1983 the Companies Code section was replaced with a revised power which, in addition 
to prospectuses, also applied to those sections in the statute that dealt with debentures, 
prescribed interests and restrictions on allotment of shares. In addition, the power 
could be exercised 'in relation to particular securities or securities included in a 
particular class of securities'.67 
With the advent of the Corporations Law in 1989, new provisions expanded the 
Commission's power of modification by adding sections that regulated the hawking of 
securities (and, in 1994, secondary trading in unquoted securities) to the existing list of 
provisions that could be modified. But more significantly, the Commission could now 
make modifications that applied to 'a particular person or persons, or a particular class 
of persons'.68 This was described in the Explanatory Memorandum to the legislation as 
'a significant extension of the modification powers' under the previous legislation.69 
Even so, it attracted no comment during the Bill's passage through Parliament. 
In April 2010, ASIC gained similar powers of modification in relation to the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth).70 
VI PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF CLASS ORDERS 
The final part of the background to ASIC's power of statutory modification concerns 
the process by which Class Orders are scrutinised and become enforceable. 
Class Orders are classified as 'legislative instruments' under the definition of that 
term found in s 5 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) (the 'LIA').71 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
65 See Part VII A of this Article. 
66 See above n 39. The modification power was found in s 58; the Eggleston principles were in 
s 59. 
67 Companies Code 1981 s 215C(6). 
68 See Corporations Law ss 1084(6)–(7) and the parallel provision for takeovers in s 730 
(emphasis added). The latter section was still subject to the Eggleston principles, set out in 
s 731. 
69 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Bill 1988 (Cth) 559. 
70 See ss 109(3)(d), 163(3)(d) of that Act. 
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Consequently, each Class Order must be registered on the Federal Register of 
Legislative Instruments (LIA s 24). Indeed, registration is necessary in order for a 
legislative instrument to be enforced (LIA s 31). Each legislative instrument must be 
accompanied by an explanatory statement which explains the purpose and operation 
of the instrument and either describes the nature of any consultation that was 
undertaken prior to the making of the instrument or explains why no consultation was 
undertaken.72 Further, s 17 requires the rule-maker to 'be satisfied that any 
consultation that is considered by the rule-maker to be appropriate and that is 
reasonably practicable to undertake, has been undertaken.' This particular requirement 
is examined later in this article. 
After registration the Class Order is tabled in each House of Parliament (LIA s 38). 
Within 15 sitting days after tabling, a notice of motion to disallow the instrument (or a 
provision in the instrument) may be given, and within 15 sitting days after that a 
resolution may be passed disallowing the instrument whereon the instrument ceases to 
have effect (LIA s 42(1)). 
There is no requirement for a legislative instrument to be debated in Parliament. 
The opportunity for debate or closer parliamentary scrutiny depends upon a motion 
for disallowance being made, and that, in turn, depends on the initiative of individual 
members of Parliament or of the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and 
Ordinances (SCRO).73 The SCRO is required to scrutinise each disallowable instrument 
to ensure: 
a) that it is in accordance with the statute [under which it is made]; 
b) that it does not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
c) that it does not unduly make the rights and liberties of citizens dependent upon 
administrative decisions which are not subject to review of their merits by a judicial or 
other independent tribunal; and 
d) that it does not contain matters more appropriate for parliamentary enactment.74 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
71 According to that definition a legislative instrument is an instrument in writing which is of 
a legislative character (in that it determines or alters the content of the law and has the 
effect of affecting a privilege or interest, imposing an obligation, creating a right or varying 
or removing an obligation or right), and it is made in the exercise of a power delegated by 
Parliament. Only two of the current sections in Table 1 above expressly provide that a 
modification which applies to a class or persons or financial products or estates is a 
legislative instrument, see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601YAA(3), 926A(4). 
72 Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 26 and the definition of 'explanatory statement' in 
s 4. 
73 The author is presently the legal adviser to the Committee. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the author. 
74 Parliament of Australia, Senate, Standing Order 23. 
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The SCRO has published guidelines on how it applies these four principles.75 In 
considering principle D, which has obvious relevance to a Class Order which modifies 
the Corporations Act, the Committee has regard to: 
 [l]egislation which fundamentally changes the law; 
 [l]egislation which is lengthy and complex; 
 [l]egislation which is intended to bring about radical changes in relationships or 
community attitudes; [and] 
 [l]egislation which is part of a uniform laws scheme.76 
While a member of either House may move a disallowance motion on any matter 
raised by the legislative instrument, the SCRO is limited to disallowance motions 
based on the principles just described. The Committee does not engage in 
consideration of any policy or substantive issues raised by legislative instruments.  
One particular aspect of the Senate's scrutiny process should be noted. As noted 
earlier, a prominent justification for a mechanism that permits ASIC to modify the Act 
or Regulations is that it allows a prompt response to problems that arise in an often 
fast-changing financial setting. Most Class Orders are expressed to commence 
operation on the date they are registered under the LIA. The Senate Committee's 
scrutiny always occurs after the legislative instrument has been made and, in most 
cases, after it has commenced operation (as was the case, for example, with the short 
selling Class Orders).77 The gap between commencement and scrutiny of an 
instrument can sometimes be several weeks, which can mean that any problems that 
might be identified by the Committee (or, indeed, by an individual Member of 
Parliament) will have already been in operation for some period of time. In the context 
of financial securities markets, this can mean that large amounts of money and 
considerable numbers of securities may have been transacted during that period.  
Finally, there is an argument that the process of parliamentary scrutiny can operate, 
in effect, as a substitute for the possibility of ex post administrative review by the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT). According to the Administrative Review 
Council, the AAT's jurisdiction should not extend to the review of decisions of a 
legislative character, at least where the decisions affect a broad class of persons and are 
'subject to the regime of scrutiny and publication that applies to legislative 
instruments.'78 This argument would clearly cover decisions to modify the Corporations 
Act via Class Order, although the matter has not yet been tested in the AAT.79 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
75 See  Senate Regulations and Ordinances Committee, Parliament of Australia, Senate 
Guidelines on the Committee's Application of its Principles (14 May 2003) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/regord_ctte/guidelines.htm>. 
76  Ibid. 
77 The SCRO meets only during weeks when the Senate is sitting and not during periods of 
parliamentary recess (sometimes up to five weeks in duration) or during estimates 
hearings, whereas legislative instruments, including Class Orders, are made and registered 
throughout the year.  
78 Administrative Review Council, ′What Decisions Should Be Subject to Merit Review?′ 
(Administrative Review Council, 1999) [3.3]–[3.7]. 
79 Whilst the AAT did hear the initial challenge to the Class Order modification that was 
eventually decided by the High Court in ASIC v DB Management Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 
321, discussed below n 100. That Order related to a specific takeover. 
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Whatever the merits of the argument, it should be noted, however, that s 1317B of the 
Corporations Act states that decisions made by ASIC under that Act are reviewable by 
the AAT.80 Certain decisions, listed in s 1317C of the Corporations Act, are excluded 
from this conferral of jurisdiction. The list of excluded decisions includes only two of 
the sections listed in Table 1 above.81 
VII THE REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
How are we to characterise the system of legislative modifications by Class Orders? 
Where does this system of notional legislation fit in our understanding of public 
regulation and of the legislative process? Before offering some answers, I should 
acknowledge that for some observers these questions may not be all that important. 
Corporate law, particularly in its statutory dimension, is affected by a noticeable 
pragmatism and so, perhaps, some corporate lawyers may wonder what the fuss is 
about. After all, the purpose of granting ASIC this power is to ensure that market 
participants can get on with their jobs and are not unnecessarily hampered by the 
unintended effects of the Corporations Act. What more, they may ask, needs to be said? 
Public lawyers, on the other hand, may identify other issues including the usurpation 
of parliamentary sovereignty, the public accountability of rule-makers and the 
different processes of scrutiny and consultation that apply to statutory law making and 
delegated law making. This part of the article identifies some issues that are raised by 
'the world of Class Orders'.  
A Regulatory Issues 
Class Order modifications are clearly an important part of ASIC's regulatory tool kit 
and so the emerging field of regulatory studies might offer guidance on how they can 
be characterised and understood.  
In recent years regulatory policy in the finance sector has been dominated by 
discussion of 'principles-based regulation', an approach endorsed by ASIC.82 As 
described by the Financial Services Authority in the UK, '[p]rinciples-based regulation 
means, where possible, moving away from dictating through detailed, prescriptive 
rules and supervisory actions how firms should operate their business.'83 Instead, the 
regulator sets 'desirable regulatory outcomes in principles and outcome-focused 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
80 By comparison the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 327(1)(a) and (b) 
specifically excludes ASIC's power of legislative modification from AAT review. 
81 The two exclusions are s 655A (relating to takeovers) and certain decisions under s 673 
which relate to securities of a target company in a takeover bid; see Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) ss 1317C(ga)–(gb). Jurisdiction to review these particular decisions is conferred on the 
Takeovers Panel by s 656A. 
82 See, eg, Jeffrey Lucy (Deputy Chair of ASIC), 'The Impact of FSR on the Regulatory Culture 
of ASIC' (Speech delivered at the 7th Annual Conference of the Australian Compliance 
Institute, Sydney, 5 September 2003) <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/ 
LookupByFileName/ACI_speech_5903.pdf/$file/ACI_speech_5903.pdf>. 
83  Financial Services Authority, 'Principles-Based Regulation: Focusing on the Outcomes that 
Matter', (Financial Services Authority April 2007) 4. 
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rules'.84 At first glance there might appear to be a principles-based element in the 
exercise of ASIC's discretion to modify the Corporations Act. As noted earlier, ASIC's 
stated policy is to exercise its discretionary power to modify the Act only where this is 
consistent with existing policy (assuming here that policy and principles mean the 
same thing).85 And as we have also seen, in some instances the Act specifically requires 
ASIC to consider particular principles before exercising its powers of exemption or 
modification.86 But it is nevertheless difficult to categorise Class Order modifications 
as an example of principles-based regulation. The notional modifications made by 
ASIC are, typically, detailed and prescriptive. They usually address specific process 
matters (for example, the process by which an issuer can make a non-traditional rights 
issue so as to be able to rely on certain other exemptions in the Act).87 Moreover, these 
notional provisions are written to fit into a statutory regime that is itself detailed and 
prescriptive. This system of rule-making sits at the opposite end of the regulatory 
spectrum from principles-based or outcomes-based regulation which relies on broadly-
drafted principles to specify desired outcomes, leaving matters of process to the 
market actors.  
How else, then, might we characterise this particular regulatory system? The class 
order system is designed to allow the existing rules to be adjusted and amended to 
better suit the particular needs of market actors where this is consistent with existing 
policy. The desired result, it might be said, is to have specialised rules which cohere 
with broader policy objectives, which respond to the circumstances of those being 
regulated, and which are, therefore, more likely to be complied with and thus be more 
effective. These three criteria — coherence, responsiveness and effectiveness — have 
been identified by Christine Parker and colleagues as 'a useful heuristic' for analysing 
regulation.88 In particular, based on the foregoing description of the process by which 
Class Orders are made, we might describe this as an example of 'responsive 
regulation'. Again, however, this label does not accurately describe what is happening. 
The mere process of application and response described by ASIC in Regulatory Guide 
51 does not of itself equate with the idea of responsive regulation, at least not as that 
idea is described in the literature.89 The literature on responsive regulation focuses on 
how rules are enforced, emphasising that regulators should be 'responsive to the 
conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding whether a more or less 
interventionist response is needed'.90 Responsive regulation seeks to integrate self-
regulatory codes with state-backed sanctions in an 'enforcement pyramid' that works 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
84 Ibid. See also Julia Black, 'Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation' (2008) 3(4) 
Capital Markets Law Journal 425; Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a 
Success of Principles-Based Regulation' (2007) 1 Law and Financial Markets Review 191. 
85 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ′Applications for Relief′ above n 29, 
[51.39]. 
86 See above n 39 and accompanying text. 
87 See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Class Order — Disclosure 
Relief for Rights Issues, CO 08/35, 12 May 2008. 
88 Christine Parker et al, 'Introduction', in Christine Parker et al (eds), Regulating Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 1, 10–11. 
89 See also Julia Black, 'Talking About Regulation' [1998] Public Law 77, 91–2. 
90 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) 88. 
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from the bottom-up, moving from less interventionist mechanisms up to the 
imposition of formal sanctions.91 By contrast, the process of modification by Class 
Order is focused more narrowly on the creation of top-down, publicly-enforced 
prescriptions. It is responsive only in the sense that the notional sections can be made 
in response to applications by market actors. What is at stake here is not simply the 
way in which rules are enforced but the text of the rules themselves. The system of 
modification by Class Order is geared towards facilitating the operation of the 
financial markets by fine-tuning the rules so that they keep pace with new 
developments. Thus, rather than 'responsive regulation' this could more accurately be 
described as 'responsive rule-making'.  
From a regulatory perspective, we might then characterise the system of 
modification by Class Order as a command-and-control system in which those who are 
subject to control have some opportunity to shape the commands. 
B Rule of Law and Separation of Powers 
The legal literature is said to approach the study of rules from a different perspective 
than the sociological or regulatory literature.92 As Parker et al observe, '[l]awyers have 
sometimes been concerned that the doctrinal coherence or values inherent in law's 
analytic framework can be threatened by the primacy of instrumental policy concerns 
in legislative regulation'.93 Legal scholars who study regulation, they suggest, are 
likely to be concerned with issues such as the openness, accountability, consistency 
and predictability of rules.94 These, of course, are values that are commonly associated 
with lawyers' depictions of the rule of law.95 The desirability of having rules that are 
certain, stable and predictable might be seen as particularly important in the context of 
securities and investment transactions which involve large amounts of money and 
which can affect the financial security of large numbers of people. Equally, from this 
perspective it might appear to be problematic that, via Class Orders, ASIC can readily 
change the primary statute as it applies to an open-ended class of people for an 
indefinite period of time.96 This concern may only be partially alleviated by the fact 
that in some instances those affected (or, at least, some of them) have asked for the 
legislative modification to be made.  
However, these concerns can be at odds with the complex and fast-changing nature 
of modern finance and corporate operations. The risk with strict adherence to the idea 
that laws should be stable, predictable and not be subject to frequent change is that 
rules which do not respond to changing circumstances — new types of securities, ever 
more complex financing and trading arrangements, and so on — can result in 
regulatory gaps, unfairness and unnecessary cost. The better approach, as Leighton 
McDonald and others have argued, is to recognise that there is no necessary 
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91 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992). 
92 Insofar as clear lines can be drawn between these different areas of study. 
93 Parker et al, above n 88, 11. 
94 Ibid 12. 
95 See, eg, the discussion in Stephen Bottomley and Simon Bronitt, Law in Context (Federation 
Press, 3rd ed, 2006) 63. 
96 Similar concerns apply to Class Orders that do not change the legislation but which change 
the way in which it operates, for example by granting wide-ranging exemptions. 
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inconsistency between rule of law concerns and contemporary legislative methods 
which grant government agencies wide regulatory discretion.97 As McDonald 
observes, 'we might, for example, insist that collaboratively generated industry-wide 
or firm-specific rules/principles can comply as fully with rule of law requirements as 
legislatively generated norms.'98 The point is that in this context we should be cautious 
about being too formulaic when addressing rule of law concerns.99 
This appears to be the approach taken by the High Court on the rare opportunity 
that it has had to examine ASIC's modification power. In ASIC v DB Management Pty 
Ltd100 the Court considered a challenge to a declaration by ASIC, under s 730 of the 
now repealed Corporations Law,101 that the compulsory acquisition provisions of the 
statute should apply to a particular takeover as if they were modified or varied by 
adding, deleting and substituting certain words. In a joint judgment, the Court upheld 
the exercise of ASIC's power. Reviewing the history of the modification power, the 
Court observed that the grant of the power 'involved a compromise between the 
technique of general legislative prescription applying inflexibly to all cases, and that of 
administrative discretion addressing issues on a case by case basis.'102 Whilst this case 
concerned a legislative modification that was specific to a particular takeover 
transaction, the Court was aware of the capacity of modifications to affect other 
persons generally, commenting that: 
The new rights and liabilities created by such a declaration cannot be confined in their 
operation so as to affect no person other than the applicant for the declaration. It is 
difficult to understand how, in practice, the power could be limited so that its exercise 
did not affect, directly or indirectly, the rights of third parties.103 
The Court held that full scope should be given to the wide discretionary powers 
granted by s 730 according to their literal meaning.104 The Court noted, and did not 
disagree with, earlier judicial commentary on the terms of the modification power 
which had emphasised 'the difficulty of pointing to any basis upon which their 
operation could be confined.'105 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
97 Leighton McDonald, 'The Rule of Law in the "New Regulatory State"' (2004) 33 Common 
Law World Review 197; see also Martin Krygier, 'The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology and 
Sociology' in G Palombella and N Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing, 
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98 McDonald, above n 97, 215–16. 
99 See generally Krygier, above n 97, describing the 'anatomical approach' to the rule of law. 
100 (1999) 199 CLR 321. This was an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal 
Court, upholding an appeal from a decision at first instance which, in turn, had affirmed an 
AAT decision affirming ASIC's declaration. See above n 79 and accompanying text. 
101 This was the Corporations Law as it stood prior to major amendments made in 1999. See 
now Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 655A, 669. Interestingly, and unlike current sections, s 
730 required an application to be made by a person to the Commission before the 
modification power could be exercised. 
102 ASIC v DB Management Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 321, 333. 
103 Ibid 341. 
104 Ibid 341–2. 
105 Ibid 338, referring to decisions of the Federal Court in Otter Gold Mines Ltd v Australian 
Securities Commission (1997) 15 ACLC 1732 and TNT Ltd v National Companies and Securities 
Commission (1986) 4 ACLC 624. 
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Related to rule of law concerns, questions about the separation of powers are also 
raised when an executive agency is granted legislative power. While we might agree 
with the idea that, for good practical reasons, agencies should have power to make 
rules, the modification powers granted to ASIC might also appear to challenge the 
idea, expressed by the Administrative Review Council, that '[t]he amendment of an 
Act of Parliament should only be made by another Act of Parliament', particularly 
where those amendments alter the obligations of people affected by those 
amendments.106 
While the High Court made no specific comment in DB Management about the 
separation of powers, it has dealt with this question previously in relation to delegated 
legislation, albeit outside the corporate law context. In Victorian Stevedoring & General 
Contracting Co Pty Ltd & Meakes v Dignan107 the High Court heard a challenge to s 3 of 
the Transport Workers Act 1928–1929 (Cth) which gave the Governor-General power to 
make regulations, not inconsistent with that Act, with respect to certain matters and 
which, notwithstanding anything in any other Act, would have the force of law. In 
concluding that the section was valid, the Court made a number of observations about 
the grant of legislative power to the executive. In their joint judgment, Gavan Duffy CJ 
and Starke J approved of Higgins J's statement in Baxter v Ah Way, that 'the Federal 
Parliament has, within its ambit, full power to frame its laws in any fashion, using any 
agent, any agency, any machinery that in its wisdom it thinks fit, for the peace, order, 
and good government' of the Commonwealth.108 On the specific question of the 
constitutional validity of such a section, Dixon J held that: 
a statute conferring upon the Executive a power to legislate upon some matter contained 
within one of the subjects of the legislative power of the Parliament is a law with respect 
to that subject, and … the distribution of legislative, executive and judicial powers in the 
Constitution does not operate to restrain the power of the Parliament to make such a 
law.109 
His Honour added that falling within the boundaries of Federal legislative power 
was necessary but not sufficient for the validity of such a law. As he put it, '[t]here may 
be such a width or such an uncertainty of the subject matter to be handed over that the 
enactment attempting it is not a law with respect to any particular head or heads of 
legislative power.'110 Evatt J pointed to the practical necessity of conferring such 
regulation-making power: 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
106 Administrative Review Council, ′Rule Making by Commonwealth Agencies′, (Report No 
35, Administrative Review Council, 26 March 1992) 16 [2.33]. 
107 (1931) 46 CLR 73. 
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It is very difficult to maintain the view that the Commonwealth Parliament has no power, 
in the exercise of its legislative power, to vest executive or other authorities with some 
power to pass regulations, statutory rules, and by-laws which, when passed, shall have 
full force and effect. Unless the legislative power of the Parliament extends this far, 
effective government would be impossible.111 
A similar argument has been made by Edward Rubin in his well-known article on 
the place of legislation in the modern administrative state.112 Rubin notes that rule-
making by agencies is 'an intrinsic and unavoidable part' of the modern administrative 
state, but he adds that rule-making and legislation are different things.113 As he puts it: 
[the] effort to equate rulemaking with legislative power springs from a premodern, 
judicially oriented attitude toward legislation. It assumes that all legislation must be 
external and transitive [that is, be stated precisely and be capable of being applied 
directly], since only such legislation can dispense with rule-making discretion by the 
implementation mechanism. … [A]gency rulemaking is necessary to translate the 
legislature's directives into rules governing the ultimate subject of the statute.114 
On the face of it, the combined effect of the decisions in Dignan and DB Management 
seems to confirm the legal validity of ASIC's powers of modification.115 Nevertheless, 
some questions remain. Dignan was concerned with the now common case of a power 
given to the executive to make delegated legislation in the form of regulations that are 
not inconsistent with the parent statute — not with the power of an executive agency 
to make rules which effect changes to the operation and application of the parent 
statute. DB Management was concerned with a power of the latter type but the Court, 
without addressing the matter expressly, appears to have treated it analogously to the 
more usual delegated rule-making power that is exercised by, for example, the SEC in 
the United States.  
One question is whether this is an accurate categorisation of ASIC's modification 
powers. Should the 'notional sections' promulgated by ASIC be classified simply as 
another instance of rule-making? The confounding factor, I suggest, is the form taken 
by these rules and their intent. They are drafted as modifications to the Act, not as 
rules regarding the operation of the Act, and, crucially, they are intended to alter the 
way in which the Act is read.  
This distinction can be illustrated by comparing three particular ways in which 
primary legislation can be affected by delegated legislation.116 
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111 Ibid 117. 
112 Edward Rubin, 'Law and Legislation in the Administrative State' (1989) 89 Columbia Law 
Review 369. 
113 Ibid 391. 
114 Ibid. 
115 For a review of the High Court's approach to the power to make delegated legislation in 
general, see Gerald Ng, 'Slaying the Ghost of Henry VIII: A Reconsideration of the Limits 
Upon the Delegation of Commonwealth Legislative Power' (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 
205. 
116 There are other possibilities. For example, Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 189A(3) permits 
regulations to be made to enable performance of Australia's obligations under the Madrid 
Protocol. Such regulations may be inconsistent with the Act and will prevail over the Act to 
the extent of any inconsistency. 
2011 The Commission's Role as a Law-maker 23 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The first is the commonly encountered arrangement in which the primary 
legislation provides for the making of regulations which prescribe matters that are 'not 
inconsistent with' the parent statute117 or which are 'necessary or convenient' for 
carrying out or giving effect to the parent statute.118 These regulations will supplement 
or amplify provisions in the primary legislation, usually dealing with matters of 
technical detail or everyday administration. Although not addressed in this article, 
there are important questions about the appropriate balance between statute and 
regulations, and the extent to which regulations are used to do the job of primary 
legislation.119 The important point is that while the regulations will affect the operation 
of the primary statute they do not amend the statute and they must be consistent with 
it.120 In this scenario a full understanding of the legislative rules governing a particular 
area will require a reading of the statute alongside the regulations.  
The second approach occurs where the primary legislation provides for the making 
of regulations which amend or repeal provisions in the primary legislation,121 using 
what is known as a Henry VIII clause (because 'that King "is regarded popularly as the 
impersonation of executive autocracy"')122. There is a considerable body of literature 
that is critical of or, at least, cautious about the use of such provisions,123 although 
there is some variation in the exact focus of concern. At its narrowest the term 'Henry 
VIII clause' refers to a statutory provision which authorises delegated legislation that 
makes an actual amendment to the parent statute. At its widest, the term has been used 
to refer to statutory provisions which authorise delegated legislation that alters the 
effect of the parent statute, even though the text of the statute remains unaltered.124 
The latter approach thus covers regulations made under the first scenario described 
above and this, I suggest, is unhelpful.125 For present purposes I adopt the narrower 
usage. 
The third possibility — the focus of this article — occurs where the primary 
legislation permits a statutory agency to expressly modify the primary statute, either 
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117 See, eg, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 172. 
118 See, eg, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1364(1)(b). 
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generally or for specific classes of actors, on the basis that this does not actually amend 
the text of the legislation but creates a set of 'shadow' or 'notional' provisions having 
force of law but which may or may not subsequently be translated into formal 
amendments of the statute. 
At first glance it may appear that changes made using the third approach are not all 
that different to amendments brought about pursuant to a Henry VIII clause and so 
should be considered in the same way. Both involve legislative instruments made 
under delegated authority which modify or change the operation of the parent statute. 
Both are subject to the process of parliamentary scrutiny and disallowance that was 
described earlier, although even at this procedural level, there are some differences: 
regulations are drafted by the Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing and must 
then be executed by the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal 
Executive Council, prior to being registered.126 This is not the case for Class Orders 
which are determined and drafted in-house by ASIC before being registered.  
There are, however, more significant differences. Henry VIII amendments, strictly 
defined, result in an explicit change to the parent legislation for all users of the statute. 
Indeed, such amendments will, over time, be integrated into the text of the Act through 
the usual processes of statutory compilation and reprinting.127 Again, this is not the 
case for changes made by Class Order. They are promulgated as 'notional' 
modifications, not as formal amendments to the Act, even though they are applied and 
enforced on the basis that they are legislative provisions. As the High Court confirmed 
in the DB Management Case, the notional sections create new rights and liabilities.128 
That is, while their legal effect is the same, their form is different. In form they appear 
to be another example of agency rule-making, and yet unlike agency-made rules they 
do not operate merely as supplements to or amplifications of the parent statute.  
In short, modifications made by Class Order appear to be a hybrid. They are not 
primary legislation, although they are expressed to operate as if they were, but unlike 
'ordinary' agency rules they do more than simply affect the operation of the Act — 
they modify the Act itself as it applies to a specified class of persons. For those in the 
defined class, the Corporations Act says what ASIC declares it to say.  
C Legislative Process 
In Part VI of this article I outlined the process of parliamentary scrutiny that applies to 
Class Orders, noting briefly the consultation requirement. Under this present heading I 
consider in more detail the extent and nature of consultation that is conducted prior to 
making a notional amendment to the Corporations Act.  
The Administrative Review Council has stated that 'consultation prior to law 
making is consistent with the principles of procedural fairness as it enables individuals 
and groups with a particular interest to put their views.'129 Similarly, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has noted that if 'the regulated community's 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
126 The regulation making power in the parent Act is given to the Governor-General who, for 
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(Cth) s 16A. 
127 See Acts Publication Act 1905 (Cth) s 2. 
128 ASIC v DB Management Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 321, 341. 
129 Administrative Review Council, above n 106, 30 [5.2]. 
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perceptions of fairness are important for compliance … there is considerable value in 
regulators consulting with regulated communities'.130 To the extent that it precedes the 
formulation of a proposed rule, consultation can operate as a form of ex ante 
accountability. That is, the rule-maker can be asked to explain why the proposed rule 
is needed, why it should be drafted in a particular way and so on. There is the prospect 
that the rule-maker can be persuaded to change the text of the proposed rule or, 
indeed, to abandon the proposed rule change altogether. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, there is no legal requirement that consultation 
must be undertaken prior to the making of a Class Order that modifies the Corporations 
Act. This is despite the fact that the legal and political structures within which 
Australian corporate law operates do place considerable emphasis on processes of 
consultation. 
The current system for making and enforcing corporate law in Australia is based on 
a constitutional arrangement between the States, Territories and the Commonwealth. 
Relying on s 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, the States have referred powers to the 
Commonwealth to permit the operation of a national scheme of legislation and 
regulatory administration. The details of this arrangement are set out in an inter-
governmental agreement between the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories — 
the Corporations Agreement 2002.131 The Agreement includes arrangements 
governing the public exposure of proposals to amend the legislation and the need in 
some instances to consult with and obtain the approval of the States and Territories for 
those amendments (via the Ministerial Council for Corporations132).  
Under the Corporations Agreement, Bills which propose amendments to the 
national corporations law must be exposed for public comment for a period of three 
months.133 There is an exception to this requirement. Public exposure may be 
shortened or dispensed with entirely when a Bill relates to any of the matters listed in 
cl 507(1) of the Agreement.134 Without going into the details of that list it is sufficient 
here to note that it includes the majority of matters listed in Table 1 above.135 Draft 
Regulations do not have to be exposed for public comment before being made.136 
However, where an amendment to the Corporations Regulations relates to one of the 
matters listed in cl 507(1), the Commonwealth may expose the amendment to public 
comment for as long as it determines. The Ministerial Council must be advised 
whether or not there will be exposure of draft Regulations, and be told the reasons for 
this.137 The Ministerial Council must be consulted about all changes to the national 
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corporation laws that are made by Bill or Regulation.138 However, Ministerial Council 
approval is not needed for Bills or Regulations which deal with any of the matters listed 
in cl 507(1) of the Agreement. 
The Corporations Agreement does not refer to ASIC's powers of statutory 
modification nor to the possibility of notional modifications to the Corporations Act 
made by ASIC Class Orders. Consequently none of the provisions in the Agreement 
about public exposure or consultation with the Ministerial Council apply to those 
notional amendments.  
The only legislative impetus (such as it is) for consultation on proposed Class 
Orders comes from the Legislative Instruments Act 2003. As described earlier, s 17 of the 
LIA merely requires the rule-maker to 'be satisfied that any consultation that is 
considered by the rule-maker to be appropriate and that is reasonably practicable to 
undertake, has been undertaken', particularly where the proposed legislative 
instrument is likely to 'have a direct, or a substantial indirect, effect on business'.139 In 
making this decision, the LIA adds that the rule-maker 'may have regard to any 
relevant matter', including whether the consultation has drawn upon the knowledge of 
experts in the field, and the extent to which persons affected by the proposed 
instrument have had adequate opportunity to comment.140 
There are two things to note about these sections. First, the LIA does not assist in 
determining what 'consultation' actually means. In practice, consultation may vary 
according to: 
 the scope and type of audience that is consulted — ranging from a select group 
of specialists or stakeholders with a particular interest in the proposed change 
(including other government departments and agencies), to the public at 
large;141 
 the time at which the consultation takes place — moving from the initial 
consideration of ideas through to the publication of a final draft of the 
instrument; and 
 the way in which the consultation is structured — including the duration of 
the consultation process, whether responses can be general or are confined to 
pre-determined questions, whether responses are to be made in writing 
(electronically or in hard copy) or in person or both, and whether responses 
are to be made public or may be given in-confidence. 
Secondly, consultation is not mandatory.142 It is left to the rule-maker to decide 
what, if any, consultation is appropriate. A rule-maker may decide that the nature of 
the instrument makes consultation unnecessary or inappropriate because, for example, 
it is minor or machinery in nature and does not substantially alter existing 
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arrangements, or because it is required as a matter of urgency.143 The LIA also states 
expressly that a failure to consult does not affect the validity or enforceability of a 
legislative instrument.144 
A third impetus for consultation may be supplied by the regulatory impact analysis 
regime that is administered by the Federal Government's Office of Best Practice 
Regulation (the OBPR).145 These requirements are imposed by executive policy rather 
than legislative mandate. The OBPR advises government departments and agencies 
(including ASIC) as to whether a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) should be 
prepared for a given regulatory proposal. This requirement will not apply if the 
regulatory impact is judged by the OBPR to be minor or machinery in nature.146 In 
exceptional circumstances an exemption from the RIS process may be granted by the 
Prime Minister. The short selling Class Orders described in Part II of this paper were 
granted such an exemption.147 If a RIS is required it must include, amongst other 
things, information about consultation that conforms to the government's best practice 
principles on consultation.148 The OBPR then assesses the adequacy of the RIS after it 
has been prepared. In relation to consultation, the OBPR will assess whether the RIS 
describes how the consultation was conducted, whether the views of those consulted 
have been described, and how those views have been taken into consideration in 
finalising the regulatory proposal. If there was not full consultation, the RIS should 
explain this.149 The OBPR publishes an annual report on the extent of compliance with 
these requirements.150 
Only a small number of Class Orders have been required to have an RIS 
prepared.151 Given this, and the latitude granted by the LIA, the conduct of 
consultation on Class Order statutory modifications depends largely on ASIC's 
discretionary judgment. The Commission's policy on consultation is set out in 
Regulatory Guide 51 which states that '[i]n general, we will only execute class orders 
on policy that is well settled or after undertaking public consultation.'152 If the 
application for relief raises new policy questions, the Commission's policy states that it 
'may seek public comment through hearings or submissions, either before or after the 
application is finalised.'153 In practice,154 the amount of consultation conducted by 
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ASIC ranges from none at all, where the modification is judged by ASIC to be minor or 
technical in nature, to general public consultation via the publication on ASIC's 
website of a Consultation Paper with a call for responses. In between these two 
extremes, ASIC engages in more limited informal consultation with specific groups 
including the Treasury, the Australian Securities Exchange, and industry and 
professional bodies. This informal, targeted consultation has certain advantages. It 
permits expert opinion to be brought to bear on the proposed changes, and it can be 
done promptly and without great cost. Equally, however, there is a risk that 
consultation of this type might be depicted as ad hoc.155 It also risks the appearance of 
being a forum for special pleading from the select group of specialists who are 
consulted. It is left to ASIC to guard against this. Indeed this is the critical point about 
the consultation process for instruments such as Class Orders. Edward Page points out 
that processes such as this are dominated by the executive agency and by interest 
groups. As Page describes it: 
the opportunities offered by consultation processes give groups a chance to make their 
points ... Influence is not guaranteed, but if their case can be made in a form that fits the 
conception of what government officials want to achieve with their proposed SIs 
[instruments], there is a chance that their views will be taken on board. … [T]he 
opportunity to have an influence, limited though it may be, offers significant cause for 
satisfaction among those groups who do participate in this way.156 
VIII  SOME REFORM PROPOSITIONS 
Judging by the number of Class Order modifications that ASIC has issued, and the 
scarcity of critical commentary about the validity or operation of the modification 
powers, this appears to be a topic to which the aphorism 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'157 
might apply. The scarcity of critical comment from the financial sector may be due to 
general satisfaction with the way in which the process operates, as Class Orders 
usually grant some form of relief from regulatory requirements. Equally, though, it 
may be due to uncertainty about the legal status of these modifications158 or, perhaps, 
to a belief that it is better to maintain good relations with the regulator.159 
Notwithstanding this absence of critique, there are some ways in which the system of 
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statutory modification by Class Order could be improved in order to address some of 
the issues raised in this article. These ideas are presented here as a series of five 
propositions. 
Proposition 1 — wherever possible, changes to the Corporations Act which would 
affect a large or open-ended class of people, and would do so for a lengthy or an 
indefinite period,160 should be made by direct formal amendment of the Act. The 
qualifier 'wherever possible' acknowledges that the process of statutory amendment is 
lengthy (especially given the consultation requirements that are part of the 
Corporations Agreement), and it is often necessary for changes to be made more 
promptly. In that situation it is appropriate for modification to be made by Class 
Order, but subject to Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2 — where a Class Order modifies the Act (or Regulations) for a large or 
open-ended class of people, and does so for a lengthy or an indefinite period, this 
should subsequently be confirmed through the ordinary process of parliamentary 
legislative reform at the earliest opportunity. This would also subject the modifications 
to the consultation and approval processes found in the Corporations Agreement 2002.  
There are many instances where modifications made via Class Order have 
subsequently found their way into formal amendments made to the Act. There does 
not, however, appear to be a systematic process for this.161 A modification may be 
caught up in a separate process of statutory review and reform (for example, the 
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Act 2007 (Cth), which 
resulted in the revocation of a number of Class Orders), but instances where Class 
Order modifications trigger the legislative reform are less common (the short selling 
amendments are one recent example). 
These first two propositions are directed at modifications which affect a large or 
open-ended class of people. In practice, as described earlier, modifications made by 
Class Order can range from those that affect a relatively narrow range of actors in 
equally narrow circumstances through to changes that are wide-ranging. While there is 
an argument that the Act should not be cluttered with amendments of narrow scope, 
this should not apply to modifications with wide application.  
Proposition 3 — where ASIC finds that it is making a number of Class Order 
modifications for a particular part of the Act, even if only for small and defined classes 
of people or for short-term operation, this should trigger a formal review of those 
statutory provisions, with the prospect of parliamentary amendment of the statute. To 
modify the aphorism: if it has to be repeatedly fixed, it might be broke. As a part of this 
review process, ASIC can, under s 11(2)(b) of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth), advise the Minister about changes to the corporations 
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legislation that are needed to overcome problems that the Commission has 
encountered in the exercise of its powers and functions.  
Proposition 4 — the process by which ASIC receives and considers applications for 
relief that result in Class Order modifications to the Act can work as a useful 'testing 
ground' for fine-tuning the regulation of the corporate and financial markets. It allows 
those who have detailed and expert knowledge of often esoteric areas of practice to 
bring to light any problems that are being created by 'the law in the books'. The 
important qualifier to this idea, however, is that after the testing has been done 
consideration must be given to formal amendments to the Act or to the Regulations.  
The default principle that underlies these first four propositions is that legislative 
change should be done by and through Parliament. This is not because Parliament is 
necessarily gifted with unique insights and skills, especially in the area of corporate 
and financial markets law reform. It is because the parliamentary processes are open to 
wide public input — they are visible and publicly accountable. It is true that those 
processes can sometimes be flawed, but the flaws are also visible. As with all default 
positions, there must be exceptions, but they should be treated as such, not as an 
alternative or parallel system of rule-making. 
Proposition 5 — consolidated versions of the legislation showing both 'actual' and 
'notional' sections (where they apply to a large or open-ended class) should be 
published by ASIC at regular intervals, to give all users and readers of the Act a clear 
idea of the full scope of its regulatory operations, and to give legislators and corporate 
law reformers a more accurate sense of where ASIC and industry perceive the gaps or 
problems to be.  
In its review of different modes of regulation, the ALRC noted that '[a]ccessibility is 
fundamental to fairness.'162 Accessibility is only part of the story, however; 
comprehensiveness is also important. Notwithstanding the fact that both the 
Corporations Act and the various Class Orders which affect its text and application are 
all publicly available in electronic format (eg through the ComLaw website163), there is 
no readily available version of the Act which integrates, rather than simply cross-
references, this material.164 The reader is left to bear the cost of piecing together 
complex legislative material, with the attendant risk of error or omission. The nature of 
the subject matter that is typically covered by Class Orders, which includes the 
regulation of managed investment schemes, takeovers, fundraising and financial 
services, is inherently complex. We should not add to that complexity by leaving it to 
those who are being regulated to piece the rules together. Nor should this task be left 
to commercial publishers; those who make the rules should have an obligation (and 
should be provided with the necessary resources) to ensure that comprehensive, 
comprehensible and contemporary compilations are available for the rule-users. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
162 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 130, 218 [6.37]. Despite its wide coverage, the 
Report does not deal with legislative modifications of the type discussed in this article. 
163 See <www.comlaw.gov.au>. 
164 Some commercially published editions of the Corporations Act note the existence of relevant 
Class Orders but do not include the text of the notional sections. 
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IX   CONCLUSION 
The article is prompted by a concern that the system of statutory modification via Class 
Order, while beneficial to the flexible regulation of the corporate and finance sector, 
has developed into a substantial and complex body of 'notional legislation'. The 
example of the short selling modifications, although not typical of the way in which 
this system usually operates, nevertheless suggests that it is timely to examine the 
scope and exercise of ASIC's modification power, and to assess how it should be 
understood within wider regulatory and legislative processes. It is necessary to strike a 
balance between the advantages of flexibility and the need for public accountability. 
The admittedly modest reform propositions put in Part VIII of this article are aimed at 
achieving that balance. 
 
 
